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INTRODUCTION

On March 30, 1996, the State of Nevada executed Richard Allan
Moran by lethal injection; he was still appealing his case when he
died.' Nearly twelve years earlier, Moran pled guilty to several
offenses, including three capital murders.2 When he stood before the
judge to enter his guilty plea, Moran declared that he wanted to plead
guilty to avoid the presentation of evidence that could prevent
imposition of the death penalty. 3 By precluding this evidence, Moran
essentially decided to end his own life. During his plea, Moran's
wounds from a suicide attempt were still healing, he was under the
influence of four medications, and he could only express himself in
one-syllable words as he responded to the judge's leading questions.4
The judge accepted Moran's plea without questioning his
competency.5
Criminal defendants have two rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause 6 regarding competency. 7 First,
1. ROBERT G. MEYER & CHRISTOPHER M. WEAVER, LAW AND MENTAL
HEALTH: A CASE-BASED APPROACH 111 (2006).

2. Moran v. State (Moran 1), 734 P.2d 712, 713 (Nev. 1987) (per curiam).
3. Moran v. Godinez (Moran II), 972 F.2d 263, 265 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 509
U.S. 389 (1993).
4. Id. at 264.
5. Id.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . ...).
7. James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562, 1569 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Lokos
v. Capps, 625 F.2d 1258, 1261-62 (5th Cir. 1980) (distinguishing between the
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defendants have the substantive due process right not to be tried,
convicted, or sentenced while incompetent. 8 Second, defendants have
the procedural due process right to have the State provide adequate
procedures for determining competency.9 This procedural right was
defined by Pate v. Robinson,10 where the Court held that a trial court
judge has a sua sponte duty to inquire into a defendant's competency
when faced with evidence raising a "bona fide doubt" that the
defendant is in fact competent." In Moran's case, the judge failed to
order a hearing sua sponte despite his perception of Moran's selfinflicted wounds, medicated demeanor, and belabored, monosyllabic
responses.12 Such observations should have given the judge
reasonable doubt as to Moran's competency to plead. 13 The court
deprived Moran of an essential constitutional protection, his
procedural due process right to adequate procedures, by failing to
order a competency hearing in the face of Moran's questionable
mental state.14 Such a procedural error is called a "Pateviolation." 5
Due to this violation, a Nevada post-conviction court required an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Moran had, in fact, been
competent to enter a guilty plea four years earlier.16 The remedy
provided by the post-conviction court, and upheld by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, required no more than an evidentiary hearing to
retrospectively determine competency." At this hearing, the postsubstantive competency right and procedural guarantee to adequate procedures).
8. James, 957 F.2d at 1573.
9. Lokos, 625 F.2d at 1261; see also Moran v. Godinez (Moran Ill), 57 F.3d
690, 695 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the State's failure to hold a competency
hearing constituted deprivation of procedural due process).
10. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
11. Id. at 385.
12. Moran II, 972 F.2d at 265.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Miller-El v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 445, 453 (5th Cir. 2001) ("If a Pate
violation is established, the federal habeas court must consider whether a meaningful
hearing can be held nunc pro tunc to determine retrospectively the petitioner's
competency as of the time of trial."); Moran III, 57 F.3d at 701 ("It is clear that a
Pate violation can only be cured by a post-conviction hearing in which the State
bears the burden of proving that the defendant was competent to stand trial.").
16. See id. at 264.
17. Moran III, 57 F.3d at 696, 700.
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conviction court presumed Moran to be competent as of the time of
his original plea, and assigned to him the burden of proving that he
was previously incompetent.' 8 Unfortunately, the only evidence
available to Moran was two psychiatric reports completed two months
before his plea-not relevant to his state of mind at the time of his
plea.' 9 In the end, the State of Nevada took Moran's life while he
continued to appeal his case. 20
The federal circuit courts conflict on the issue of what procedure
to afford a petitioner who has established a Pate violation. 2 ' The
Supreme Court has never approved of a remedy for a Pate violation
other than reversal of the conviction and remand for new trial.2 2
However, the Court has, in dicta, acknowledged the possibility of
holding a retrospective competency hearing. 23 Without much guidance
from the Court, the circuits have been left to determine the appropriate
procedure for remedying a Pate violation. The circuit courts have
created and adopted procedural remedies that allow for retrospective
determinations of competency. 24 However, the circuit courts split with
18. Id. at 698 ("[T]he post-conviction court violated Nevada law when it
placed the burden of proving competency on Moran. This violation of state law,
however, did not result in the deprivation of a substantive right, because the State
provided Moran with constitutionally adequate procedures to evaluate his
competency . . . .") (citation omitted).

19. Moran II, 972 F.2d at 267 & n.7; see also Moran III, 57 F.3d at 696
(stating that the same judge who oversaw Moran's challenged change of plea also
oversaw the post-conviction proceedings and that evidence also included the records
of two hearings held within two months after the change of plea).
20. MEYER & WEAVER, supra note 1, at 111.
21. Compare Moran III, 57 F.3d at 697-98 (holding that the federal
Constitution does not require states to assign the burden of proof to the prosecution
in nunc pro tunc competency hearings), and Lokos v. Capps, 625 F.2d 1258, 1262
(5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the petitioner bears the burden of proof in nunc pro
tunc competency hearings), with James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562, 1570 (1lth
Cir. 1992) (stating, in dicta, that the State bears the burden of proof in a
retrospective competency hearing because such a hearing constitutes harmless error
analysis).
22. See, e.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386 (1966); Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162, 183 (1975).
23. See, e.g., Pate,383 U.S. at 387; Drope,420 U.S. at 183.
24. See, e.g., Moran III, 57 F.3d at 696 (approving retrospective competency
hearings as a cure for Pate violations); Lokos, 625 F.2d at 1262 (same); James, 957
F.2d at 1571 (same).
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respect to where the burden of proof lies in retrospective competency
hearings. 25 Although the circuit courts have created procedures for
retrospectively determining competency, "[r]eason exists to believe
the United States Supreme Court would not approve the
procedure[s]."26
This Comment argues that the United States Supreme Court
would not approve of retrospective competency determinations in the
context of Pate violations because the procedure violates due process.
Instead, the only adequate remedy for a Pate violation is the reversal
of the underlying conviction and remand of the case for retrial. Any
attempt to retrospectively determine competency violates the
procedural due process right guaranteed by Pate. The trial court
violates a defendant's constitutional rights by failing to provide
adequate procedures for determining competency-i.e., a competency
hearing at the time of trial. Retrospective competency hearings rely on
more limited and less reliable evidence than a contemporaneous
hearing. 27 Hence, a retrospective competency hearing denies the
defendant the adequate procedures guaranteed by Pate. In short,
providing a defendant any less than the adequate procedures
guaranteed by Pate not only fails to remedy the violation, it
completely vitiates the rights guaranteed by Pate.2 8
25. Seesupranote2l.
26. People v. Ary, 246 P.3d 322, 330 (Cal. 2011) (Werdegar, J., concurring).
27. Generally, in order to hold a retrospective competency hearing, the court
must find sufficient evidence exists with which to hold a meaningful hearing,
including "medical records and prior competency determinations . . . statements by
the defendant in the trial record, and . . . the availability of individuals and trial

witnesses, both experts and non-experts, who were in a position to interact with
defendant." Clayton v. Gibson, 199 F.3d 1162, 1169 (10th Cir. 1999). However, as
in Moran, even if such records and witnesses exist, the evidence remains limited and
unreliable compared to the evidence provided by a contemporaneous evaluation and
hearing. See Moran II, 972 F.2d at 267 & n.7 (utilizing psychological evaluations
not made during the relevant time frame of the defendant's change of plea). When a
court holds a contemporaneous hearing, the defendant and prosecution each receive
a full and fair opportunity to gather evidence of the defendant's then existing state of
mind. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b) (2010) (authorizing the court to order an examination
of the defendant prior to the hearing date).
28. Addressing retrospective competency hearings in the context of Due
Process constitutes an important legal endeavor for two reasons. First, very little has
been written by scholars regarding the remedies provided by reviewing courts.
Hence, the circuit split regarding the proper remedy has eluded critical analysis.
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Section I of this Comment will address the history of, and policy
for, the right not to be tried while incompetent, and then outline the
procedures enacted by federal and state governments to protect that
right. Section II summarizes the Supreme Court's decision in Pate v.
Robinson. It then addresses practical situations that give rise to a Pate
claim. Section III first analyzes the scope of the procedural rights
guaranteed by Pate through the Court's procedural due process
standards. Section III then applies the due process requirements of
Pate to the existing remedies afforded by reviewing courts to
petitioners or appellants who have successfully raised a Pate claim.
This Comment concludes by arguing that procedural due process
demands all Pate violations be remedied by summary reversal and

Second, Pate violations often arise in criminal cases with very high stakes. More
often than not, Pate violations are argued in criminal appeals where the defendant
has been sentenced to life in prison or, as in Moran's case, death. Besides Richard
Moran, other defendants have been executed after courts ordered retrospective
competency hearings to avoid reversing the underlying conviction. In 2001, the
State of Oklahoma executed Robert William Clayton. Year's Executions Detailed,
TULSA WORLD, Aug. 30, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 11776211. Although the
trial court violated Clayton's constitutional rights under Pate by failing to hold a
competency hearing, the conviction was upheld on appeal because a jury found the
defendant had been competent in a retrospective competency hearing six years after
the trial. Clayton v. State, 840 P.2d 18, 24 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992). Similarly, the
Commonwealth of Kentucky found that a trial court had committed a Pate violation
when it failed to hold a competency hearing during William Eugene Thompson's
murder trial seven years earlier. Thompson v. Commonwealth, 56 S.W.3d 406, 40809 (Ky. 2001). However, the Supreme Court of Kentucky remanded to the
commonwealth's circuit court to determine if a retrospective competency hearing
could be held, and, if so, to hold the hearing. Id. at 410. As of the publication of this
Comment, Thompson remains on death row in Kentucky. Brett Barrouquere, Death
Row Inmate Says Jurors Biased, KY. POST, Mar. 2, 2011, available at http://www.
kypost.com/dpp/news/state/ExecutionThompson 90702846. Most recently, the
California Supreme Court upheld the life sentence of James Ary, Jr. following a
retrospective competency determination held five years after his trial. People v. Ary,
246 P.3d 322, 325-26, 329-30 (Cal. 2011). Regarding the fact that Pate violations
are argued in high stakes cases, the Supreme Court announced, in the context of
capital cases, the severity of the sentence imposed on a criminal defendant creates a
heightened need for reliability in the underlying factfinding procedures. See, e.g.,
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) ("In capital proceedings generally,
this Court has demanded factfinding procedures aspire to a heightened standard of
reliability."). Retrospective competency hearings cannot provide a remedy
commensurate with the reliability needed in such criminal cases.
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remand for a new trial, unless the violation arose via an ancillary error
within a contemporaneous competency hearing.
I. THE RIGHT NOT TO STAND TRIAL WHILE INCOMPETENT

A. History
The right of a criminal defendant not to be tried while
incompetent has well-established roots. In the nineteenth century,
courts recognized that state statutes prohibiting the trial, sentencing, or
punishment of incompetent defendants introduced no new legal
principles beyond those established by the common law.29 Further,
"all the common-law authorities" agree that one who is currently
incompetent cannot be arraigned, tried, sentenced, or executed.3 0 This
right shares its conceptual footing with the right not to be tried in
absentia; both rights ensure a criminal defendant is provided an
opportunity to present a defense. 3 1 In addition to the common law's
purpose for providing criminal defendants with the right not to be
tried while incompetent, modem courts have determined this right
plays an essential role in the criminal justice system. 32
Along with ensuring criminal defendants the ability to present a
defense, modem courts have found additional reasons to uphold this
right. The Supreme Court has held the conviction of a defendant while
legally incompetent violates the United States Constitution as a
deprivation of liberty without due process.3 3 Because the fairness of a
29. Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847).
30. Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1899).
31. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (citing Caleb Foote, A
Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REv.
832, 834 (1960)); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *24-25
(comparing the practice of trying an incompetent defendant with the "savage and
inhuman law" enacted during the reign of Henry VIII allowing those charged with
treason to be tried in the defendant's absence when the defendant was insane).
32. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 171-72 ("[lI]t suffices to note that the prohibition
[against trying an incompetent defendant] is fundamental to an adversary system of
justice.").
33. White v. Estelle, 459 U.S. 1118, 1121 (1983) ("Due process forbids a state
to try or convict a defendant who is incompetent to stand trial."); see also Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (citing Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961
(1956) ("[T]he conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent
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criminal trial depends on a defendant's ability to make important
decisions on his or her own and with the assistance of counsel,3 4 the
Court has deemed the right not to be tried while incompetent
"fundamental to an adversary system of justice."35 The Court
established the current test for determining legal competency to stand
trial in 1960, in Dusky v. United States36 : "[W]hether [the defendant]
has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him." 37
As illustrated above, the Supreme Court has long held the
conviction of an incompetent criminal defendant violates due process.
However, the Court has provided a further right by holding that
criminal defendants have a due process right to adequate procedures
for protecting the substantive right. Deprivation of this procedural
due process right constitutes a Pate violation, for the Court first
announced the right in Pate v. Robinson.39 In order to adequately
protect criminal defendants' due process rights under both Bishop and
Pate, federal and state statutes establish robust criminal procedures
imposing duties on parties and the court to raise the issue. A criminal
defendant cannot waive his or her right not to stand trial while
incompetent; a defendant may always claim a violation of that right on
appeal or through habeas petition.4 0

violates due process . ....

34. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 364 (1996).
35. Drope, 420 U.S. at 171-72.
36. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
37. Id. at 402.
38. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 385-86; Drope, 420 U.S. at 172. Pate v. Robinson is
examined further in Section III.
39. Pate, 383 U.S. at 386.
40. Id. at 384 (reasoning that one cannot knowingly and voluntarily waive the
issue of one's own competency because if one is incompetent, he or she lacks the
ability to waive that very issue).
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B. Federaland State ProceduresEnsuring the Right Not to
Stand Trial While Incompetent
Both the common law and the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the United States Constitution compel federal and state governments
to refrain from trying incompetent criminal defendants. 4 1 Accordingly,
Congress and state legislatures have established statutory criminal
procedures for ensuring that right. Despite differences regarding
which party bears the burden of proof in competency hearings at the
time of trial, Supreme Court precedent makes it clear that these
procedures are constitutionally sufficient to protect the due process
right not to be tried while incompetent.4 2
In 18 U.S.C. § 4241, Congress established the procedure for
determining a criminal defendant's competency to stand trial in
federal prosecutions during the time period between commencement
of prosecution and determination of sentence. 43 At any time during the
prescribed period, the statute requires the court to hold a hearing upon
written motion by either party or on the court's motion sua sponte. 44
Evidence that raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's
competency to stand trial entitles the defendant to a hearing on the
issue.45 If, by a preponderance of the evidence, the court finds the
defendant incompetent, the prosecution cannot proceed and the
government takes custody of the defendant for hospitalization and
treatment.4 6 Because Congress failed to articulate which party carries
the burden of proof, courts have struggled to interpret the statute and
have split on the issue. 4 7

41. See supra Section I.A.
42. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2010).
44. Id. (requiring a hearing if "there is reasonable cause to believe that the
defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him
mentally incompetent").
45. Id.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2010).
47. Steven R. Marino, Comment, Are You Sufficiently Competent to Prove
Your Incompetence? An Analysis of the Paradox of the Federal Courts, 6 SETON
HALL CIRcUIT REV. 165, 178-79 (2009); see also Brett F. Kinney, Comment, An
Incompetent Jurisdiction: The Burden of Proofin Competency Hearings, 43 U.C.
DAVIs L. REv. 683, 694 (2009).
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Procedures for raising and determining the issue of a defendant's
competency to stand trial have been established by statute in all fifty
states.4 8 California provides for a hearing whenever defense counsel
requests one or when "doubt arises in the mind of the judge." 49 As
they would under federal law, California trial judges have a sua sponte
duty to provide criminal defendants a hearing to determine
competency to stand trial. This duty arises when there is "substantial
evidence of mental incompetence"-evidence raising a reasonable
doubt-regardless of its source.5 0 Other states' statutes provide for a
similar sua sponte duty.5 1
As at the federal level, state courts are split on whether to (1)
require the State to prove competence, or (2) require the defendant to
prove incompetence. For instance, California places the burden of
proof on defendants in section 1368 hearings to prove incompetency. 52
The Supreme Court has permitted such an approach by holding that
state laws requiring defendants to bear the burden of proving their
own incompetency do not violate procedural due process.5 3 However,
some states (e.g., New York) provide criminal defendants with added
protection by placing the burden on the State to prove competency. 54
Notwithstanding federal and state laws imposing a sua sponte
duty on courts to hold hearings when doubt of a defendant's
competency to stand trial arises, criminal defendants still face a risk of
trial, conviction, and imprisonment despite mental incompetency.55
48. Mae C. Quinn, Reconceptualizing Competence: An Appeal, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 259, 267 (2009).
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1368(a) (West 2010).
50. People v. Howard, 824 P.2d 1315, 1331 (Cal. 1992).
51. Quinn, supranote 48, at 267-68 & n.33.
52. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1369(f) (West 2010); People v. Kaplan, 57 Cal. Rptr.
3d 143, 150 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing People v. Marshall, 931 P.2d 262, 277 (Cal.
1997)).
53. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,453 (1992).
54. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.30 (McKinney 2010); People v. Christopher,
482 N.E.2d 45, 49 (N.Y. 1985).
55. There are two distinct dangers presented regarding errors in competency
determinations. First, failing to hold a competency hearing creates a danger of trying
an incompetent criminal defendant in violation of the substantive guarantee against
standing trial while incompetent. Second, failing to hold a competency hearing
creates a danger of failing to comply with the Due Process requirement of providing
adequate procedures when doubt exists as to the defendant's competency.
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The current procedures for determining competency at the time of trial
clearly comport with the Supreme Court's interpretation of adequate
due process protection.5 6 However, the procedures for reviewing and
remedying the issue of competency to stand trial on appeal remain
clouded.17

Regarding the first danger, the number of criminal defendants who prevail
on appeal regarding substantive claims of incompetency illustrates the danger of
standing trial while incompetent. A study of substantive claims of incompetency and
their prevalence lies outside the scope of this Comment. However, some legal
scholars suggest that structural deficiencies in the test for competency to stand trial
contribute to the danger. See Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Physically Present, Yet
Mentally Absent, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 313, 317 (2009) (examining "the flaws
in the competency to stand trial standard: vagueness, lack of uniform testing criteria,
and failure to consider the etiology and prognosis of serious mental illnesses"). In
contrast, the results of empirical studies point to a high degree of agreement between
the legal determinations made by courts and the clinical determinations of impartial
mental health professionals. See Melissa L. Cox & Patricia A. Zapf, Ph.D.,
Comment, An Investigation of DiscrepanciesBetween Mental Health Professionals
and the Courts in DecisionsAbout Competency, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 109, 131
(2004).
The second danger produces an equally valid concern. The failure to hold a
competency hearing offends the guarantee of Due Process rights provided under
Pate. In addition, through a denial of adequate procedures, this danger includes the
danger of trying a defendant while incompetent, thus folding the first danger into the
second.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Dusky standard provides a valid and
meaningful assessment of competency to stand trial, then the strong agreement
between judicial and clinical determinations of competency suggests that taking the
step of ordering a competency hearing, pursuant to Pate, will eliminate a significant
risk of trying and convicting incompetent defendants.
56. Medina, 505 U.S. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
57. Compare, e.g., Moran III, 57 F.3d 690, 698, 700 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that a retrospective competency hearing cures the procedural due process violation
that results from a court's failure to hold a competency hearing sua sponte and
placing the burden of proof on the defendant to prove incompetency), with James v.
Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562, 1571 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that a retrospective
competency hearing is a harmless error inquiry requiring the burden of proof be
placed on the State to prove competency).
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II. PATE GUARANTEES THAT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS RECEIVE
ADEQUATE PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING COMPETENCY

A. Pate v. Robinson's ProceduralDue ProcessRight
In Pate, the Court held that criminal defendants have a procedural
due process right to adequate procedures for determining
competency." Specifically, a criminal defendant has the right to a
competency hearing whenever evidence before the court raises a
reasonable doubt of the defendant's competency.
In Pate, defendant Robinson was tried and convicted of murdering
his common-law wife.60 Four defense witnesses testified at trial.6 1
Each witness provided personal knowledge and an opinion regarding
Robinson's incompetency to stand trial.6 2 According to Robinson's
mother, his mental illness began at the age of seven or eight when "a
brick dropped from a third floor hit Robinson on the head."6 3 Through
these witnesses, the trial judge had evidence of a prolonged history of
mental illness and "pronounced irrational behavior."64 Despite this
evidence, the trial judge convicted Robinson and sentenced him to life

in prison. 65
The Supreme Court ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, remanding the case for retrial.6 6 The Court held that the State
violated Robinson's due process rights when the trial court failed to
order a competency hearing sua sponte. 67 Under the applicable Illinois
statute governing competency evaluations, the judge had a sua sponte
duty to do so when evidence before the court raised a "bona fide
doubt" of competency. 68
58. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386 (1966).
59. Id. at 385.
60. Id. at 376.
61. Id. at 378.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 378-79.
64. Id at 385-86.
65. Id. at 384.
66. Id. at 386.
67. Id. at 385.
68. Id. (quoting People v. Shrake, 182 N.E.2d 754, 754 (Ill. 1962) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although Pate turned on whether "bona fide doubt"
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The Court determined the evidence did raise a bona fide doubt.6 9
The Court reasoned that the trial judge could not rely on his own
observation of Robinson's demeanor in court "to dispense with a
hearing" to determine competency. 70 Neither could the judge rely on a
single psychiatric report that failed to give an opinion regarding the
ultimate issue of competency.7 1 Hence, Robinson had been tried and
convicted without adequate procedures to determine his competency. 72
The "adequate procedures" guaranteed by the Constitution consisted
of the procedures needed to make a "concurrent determination" of
Robinson's competency to stand trial.7 3
Regarding whether Robinson had forfeited the issue of
competency by not raising it at trial, the Court held that a criminal
defendant cannot waive the right not to be tried while incompetent.7 4
Because an incompetent defendant cannot waive the right unless he or
she was competent, the Court reasoned that the concept of waiving the
competency issue constituted a contradiction. Thus, the defendant's
own failure to raise the competency issue at the time of trial does not
constitute a waiver and the issue is preserved for appeal.7 6 In essence,
Pate forces the trial judge to bear the responsibility of ensuring that no

existed under an Illinois statute, the Court has not determined the minimal "quantum
of evidence necessary to require resort to an adequate procedure." Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). Nevertheless, most lower courts apply the bona
fide doubt standard "because it is no less helpful than any other standard that might
be imagined." Zapata v. Estelle, 588 F.2d 1017, 1020 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979). Some
courts apply a "reasonable ground" standard instead of the "bona fide doubt"
standard. Silverstein v. Henderson, 706 F.2d 361, 369 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting
United States ex rel. Roth v. Zelker, 455 F.2d 1105, 1108 (2d Cir. 1972) (internal
quotation marks omitted). It is doubtful, however, whether any meaningful
difference lies between the two standards.
69. Pate, 383 U.S. at 385-86 (reasoning that "testimony of Robinson's history
of pronounced irrational behavior" could not be ignored on the basis of rational
"demeanor at trial" and an inconclusive psychiatric report).
70. Id. at 385.
71. Id. at 383-84.
72. Id. at 385.
73. Id. at 387 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 384.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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criminal defendants of questionable competency pass through the
courtroom without a hearing to determine the issue.
Having established that the State violated Robinson's
constitutional right to adequate competency procedures, the Court
turned to the issue of what remedy to provide Robinson. The Court
noted the State's argument on appeal that a retrospective hearing
limited to the issue of competency could sufficiently vindicate
Robinson's rights, thereby preserving the prior conviction. 7 However,
citing Dusky, the Court rejected that remedy because of "the
difficulty in retroactively determining an accused's competence to
stand trial." 79 The Court then ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, remanding the case to the state trial court for retrial.o
B. A Pate Violation Occurs When ReasonableDoubt
of Competency Exists at Trial
Pate establishes a firm rule regarding when a trial court must
order a competency hearing: whenever there is reasonable doubt as to
the defendant's competency. 8 ' Because the Court held a defendant
cannot waive his or her right not to stand trial while incompetent, a
Pate violation is preserved for appeal without any action by the
defendant or his counsel. 82 Thus, proving that a Pate violation
occurred requires an appellant or habeas petitioner to show only facts
sufficient to establish reasonable doubt regarding competency at the
time of trial.
The initial substantive query for a Pate claim is objectivenamely, "whether a reasonable judge, situated as was the trial court
judge whose failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing is being
reviewed, should have experienced doubt with respect to competency

77. Id. at 387.
78. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (1960) ("In view of . .. the
resulting difficulties of retrospectively determining the petitioner's competency as of
more than a year ago, we reverse . . . and remand the case to the District Court ...

for a new trial if petitioner is found competent.").
79. Pate, 383 U.S. at 387.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 385.
82. See id at 384.
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to stand trial."8 In ruling on this inquiry, the reviewing court should
examine the "totality of the circumstances" insofar as they existed
before the trial judge.8 4 Although the reviewing court must consider
any history of irrational behavior alongside the petitioner's demeanor
at trial and any medical opinions, any one factor alone may
sufficiently raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable trial
judge.8 5 If the petitioner establishes reasonable doubt as to his or her
competency at the time of trial, the petitioner has proven that a Pate
violation has occurred. 86

83. De Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 1976); accord
Williams v. Bordenkircher, 696 F.2d 464, 467 (6th Cir. 1983). When a Pate
violation is raised in a federal habeas proceeding, this threshold burden may require
the petitioner to show reasonable doubt by clear and convincing evidence. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2010) (requiring habeas courts to give state court factual
determinations a presumption of correctness, rebuttable by a showing of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary). The Supreme Court has held that a trial court's
failure to entertain a bona fide doubt as to competency of a defendant constitutes a
factual finding, at least when the trial court explicitly makes a factual finding
regarding the evidence before the court. See Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117
(1983) (holding that a "factual conclusion," ancillary to competency, constitutes a
question of fact pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)), aff'd by Demosthenes v. Baal, 495
U.S. 731 (1990). Fulford and Demosthenes have created a circuit split regarding
whether a competency determination constitutes a factual finding deserving a
presumption of correctness. See 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 954-55 n.55 (5th ed. 2001); Card v.
Singletary, 981 F.2d 481, 485 n.5 (11th Cir. 1992) ("In Demonsthenes, the Court
noted that state court factual findings regarding a petitioner's competency are
entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254." (emphasis
added)). Despite the circuit split regarding whether a competency determination is a
factual finding, it is reasonably clear that most circuit courts would hold that factual
conclusions (such as evaluations of strength and credibility of evidence) underlying
a trial judge's decision to hold or not to hold a competency hearing deserve a
presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Filiaggi v. Bagley, 445 F.3d
851, 855-56, 859 (6th Cir. 2006). But see Rivers v. Franzen, 692 F.2d 491, 497 (7th
Cir. 1982) (holding that no presumption of correctness attaches to a trial court's
failure to entertain bona fide doubt).
84. McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 955 (10th Cir. 2001) (analyzing
several categories of evidence before the trial judge, including petitioner's history of
mental illness, medications taken, demeanor at trial, and counsel's stated concerns).
85. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975).
86. Moran III, 57 F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 1995); accord Silverstein v.
Henderson, 706 F.2d 361, 369 (2d Cir. 1983).
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C Scenarios Where Pate Violations Occur
Although state and federal prosecutions occur pursuant to robust
statutory procedures for protecting a criminal defendant's due process
right not to be tried while incompetent, numerous scenarios result in
the wrongful conviction of incompetent defendants.
Defense attorneys play an integral role in raising (or failing to
raise) competency issues." This role likely arises because defense
attorneys have greater access to their clients and increased control
over how and what prosecutors and courts observe. 89 Defense
attorneys almost universally coach their clients to act stoic and
respectful in court, deterring clients from engaging in behavior that
would otherwise suggest to a judge the possibility of incompetency. 9 0
Further, defense attorneys may recognize incompetency issues but fail
to raise them when their client will likely receive a prison term that is
relatively shorter than the potentially extended "sentence" in a state
hospital. 9 1 A defense attorney may also fail to raise the issue of
competency because the attorney plans to utilize an insanity defense
and fears raising incompetency at the pretrial stage would provide the
prosecution with unlimited access to evidence of his or her client's
mental state. 9 2
87. See infra Part I.B. (discussing 18 U.S.C.

§ 4241(a) (2010) and CAL.

PENAL

CODE § 1368(a) (West 2010)).

88. See generally Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the CriminalDefense Lawyer
in Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of
the Court?, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 65; Norma Schrock, Note, Defense Counsel's Role in
DeterminingCompetency to Stand Trial, 9 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 639 (1996).
89. See Uphoff, supra note 88, at 68-69 (discussing the role defense attorneys
play as counselors). Defense attorneys may have greater access and control only
when their clients have been released from custody; however, it is also possible to
argue that the State has greater access to criminal defendants through the jail system.
See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 465 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(noting that the State will have greater access to a defendant in custody).
90. See Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1088-89 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2001).
91. Uphoff, supra note 88, at 71-72. Under federal law, a criminal defendant
may be committed to an institution for up to four months as well as "an additional
reasonable period of time" if "there is a substantial probability" the defendant will
become competent for trial. 18 U.S.C. § 424 1(d) (2010).
92. Robert D. Miller & Edward J. Germain, The Retrospective Evaluation of
Competency to Stand Trial, 11 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 113, 114 (1988)
(thoroughly examining the ways in which Pate claims arise via the actions of the
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The court itself may also play a role in denying criminal
defendants due process. Judges can fail to utilize their sua sponte
power to order a competency hearing despite evidence of
incompetency. For instance, problems may arise regarding the
application of the Dusky standard because of the confusion
surrounding the attorney-client relationship: whether a judge finds that
a defendant's irrational belief or inability to communicate regarding a
particular aspect of defense strategy constitutes incompetency will
turn on whether the judge believes the attorney bears sole
responsibility for making the decision in question. 93
Pate claims may also arise through ancillary procedural errors
occurring during a competency hearing. 94 If such a procedural error
causes prejudice or substantially affects the competency
determination, it will render the competency determination
procedurally inadequate under Pate.95 Such errors occur when there is
a failure to allow defendants to cross-examine witnesses 96 or to
present evidence. 97 Finally, Pate violations occur when there is a
failure to provide defendants legal representation during competency

hearings. 98
court and counsel).
93. Id. at 115.
94. See, e.g., Lewis v. Zon, 573 F. Supp. 2d 804, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(holding that a Pate violation occurred during a contemporaneous competency
hearing when defendant was denied an opportunity to cross-examine evidence).
95. See, e.g., id. (holding that a Pate violation was not harmless where
depriving the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine evidence in a
contemporaneous competency hearing substantially affected the outcome of the
competency hearing).
96. Id. at 815 (holding that failure to allow defendant to respond to the
prosecution's evidence of competency created a constitutionally inadequate
competency hearing).
97. See Greenfield v. Gunn, 556 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that a
competency hearing was constitutionally adequate because (1) the hearing was
adversarial, (2) defendant was represented by counsel, (3) defendant was present,
and (4) defendant had an opportunity to present evidence), cited with approval in
Akhtar v. Knowles, No. CIV S-03-2674, 2009 WL 57619, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9,
2009).
98. United States v. Purnett, 910 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a
trial court cannot hold a competency hearing in which the court openly questions the
defendant's competency while allowing the defendant to represent himself because
allowing self-representations assumes the defendant was competent to waive his
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As indicated above, numerous scenarios can create Pate
violations. Alarmingly, remedies provided by the federal circuit courts
are numerous (and diverse) as well. 99 When the Supreme Court finds a
violation it consistently maintains that reversal of the underlying
conviction and remand for retrial constitutes the ,only viable remedy
because of the inherent difficulties posed by any attempt to
retrospectively determine competency. 100 Because the Court has never
ordered such a hearing, the Court has never expounded on the purpose
or procedure for holding further proceedings to retrospectively
determine competency. As a result, lower courts, both federal and
state, have filled this void with conflicting views on how to remedy a
Pate violation.

III.

ANY REMEDY FOR A PATE VIOLATION MUST PROVIDE
CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE PROCEDURES

If Pate guarantees a criminal defendant adequate procedures for
determining competency under the Due Process Clause, then the
remedy afforded to a criminal appellant or petitioner who has been the
victim of a Pate violation cannot lead to affirmation of the conviction
with less than the adequate procedural protection mandated by Pate.
Starting from the simple proposition that the remedy for a Pate
violation must provide equivalent procedural due process protection as
that guaranteed at trial under Pate, each of the presently practiced
remedies will be examined. The presently utilized remedies consist of
(1) nunc pro tunc1 0t retrospective competency hearings,1 02 (2)
right to counsel).
99. Compare Moran III, 57 F.3d 690, 697 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
federal constitution does not require states to assign the burden of proof to the
prosecution in nunc pro tunc competency hearings), and Lokos v. Capps, 625 F.2d
1258, 1262 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that petitioner bears the burden of proof in nunc
pro tunc competency hearings), with James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562, 1571 (11th
Cir. 1992) (stating, in dicta, that the State bears the burden of proof in retrospective
competency hearings because such hearings constitute "harmless error inquiry").
100. See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183 (1975) (holding
defendant's competency could not be determined retrospectively and therefore
remanding to state trial court for an opportunity to retry if defendant is found to be
presently competent); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966) (same).);
101. Nunc pro tunc is a Latin phrase meaning "now for then" and refers to a
legal device, such as an order or hearing, "[h]aving retroactive legal effect through a
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harmless error retrospective hearings,' 03 and (3) reversal of conviction
and remand for retrial.' 0 4 As discussed below, neither nunc pro tunc
nor harmless error retrospective hearings provide the same procedural
safeguards as a contemporaneous hearing. Only reversal and remand
in all cases adequately protects a defendant's procedural due process
rights under Pate.
Because this Comment examines the adequacy of remedies
through comparison to the procedures guaranteed by Pate under due
process, the adequate procedures guaranteed by Pate must first be
given a substantive description. The substantive description of
adequate procedures is derived from analysis of current Supreme
Court jurisprudence regarding procedural due process. Section A
below sets out the standard of adequate procedures derived from the
Court's procedural due process analysis. Sections B, C, and D then
evaluate current remedies for compliance with the procedural due
process requirements of Pate.

court's inherent power." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1174 (9th ed. 2009).
102. See, e.g., Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001)
(remanding to the district court with directions to grant the petition for writ of
habeas corpus unless the state trial court conducted a retrospective hearing within
sixty days); Silverstein v. Henderson, 706 F.2d 361, 369 (2d Cir. 1983) (reversing
district court's dismissal of habeas petition and directing issuance of the writ unless
the State were to bring petitioner to trial "within a reasonable time," after
determining no retrospective hearing was possible); Zapata v. Estelle, 588 F.2d
1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1979) (remanding to district court for a retrospective hearing).
103. See, e.g., James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562, 1571 (11th Cir. 1992)
(holding that retrospectively determining defendant's competency following a Pate
violation constitutes harmless error inquiry); Lewis v. Zon, 573 F. Supp. 2d 804,
820-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that refusal to allow defendant an opportunity to
respond to state evidence violates Pate as an inadequate procedure and subjecting
that error to harmless error analysis).
104. See, e.g., Pate, 383 U.S. at 385-86 (reversing and remanding for new trial
after noting that an adequate retrospective competency hearing could not be held);
Drope, 420 U.S. at 172 (same).
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A. ProceduralDue ProcessRequires that Adequate Procedures
Include the Right to an AdversarialHearingand an Opportunity
to Gather andPresentEvidence
In Medina v. California,0 5 the Court established the standard for
evaluating due process claims regarding criminal procedure.' 0 6 Under
Medina, a state's discretion to provide criminal procedures for the
prosecution of criminal defendants will not offend due process "unless
'it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental."'l 0 7 However,
the Court nevertheless recognized that criminal procedure cannot
"transgress any recognized principle of 'fundamental fairness' in
operation."' 0 8 In the Medina Court's analysis of what procedure for
determining competency accords with fundamental fairness, the Court
illuminated what minimal procedural safeguards constitute the
adequateprocedures protected by Pate.'09
First, the Court stated that "it is enough that the State affords the
criminal defendant on whose behalf a plea of incompetence is asserted
a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that he is not competent to
105. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
106. Id. at 445.
107. Id. (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977) (citations
omitted)), cited with approval in Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist.
v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2320 (2009).
108. Id. at 448; see also id. at 461 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Court's
originalist position on procedural due process in criminal contexts presented in
Medina has been criticized on grounds that the Court itself does not always respect
such limitations. See Bruce J. Winnick, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in
Determining Competency to Stand Trial: An Analysis of Medina v. California and
the Supreme Court's New Due Process Methodology in Criminal Cases, 47 U.
MIAmi L. REV. 817, 827-28 (1993) (noting that the Court frequently relies on
"contemporary conceptions ofjustice" when invalidating criminal justice practices).
109. The issue of what constitutes the necessary elements of an adequate
competency hearing under Pate has not been directly answered by any court. The
Ninth Circuit has held that a competency hearing was adequate because (1) the
hearing was adversarial, (2) defendant was present at the hearing, (3) defendant was
represented by counsel, and (4) defendant was allowed to present evidence.
Greenfield v. Gunn, 556 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1977). Greenfield has not had great
influence on other courts. However, it has recently been cited by a federal district
court. See Akhtar v. Knowles, No. CIV S-03-2674, 2009 WL 57619, at *6 (E.D.
Cal. Jan. 9, 2009).
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stand trial."1 0 The Court described such an opportunity to
demonstrate incompetence as including the right to assistance of
counsel and the opportunity to bring "psychiatric evidence . .. to bear

on the question of the defendant's mental condition.""' Thus, Medina
clearly provides that the constitutionally adequate procedural
safeguards required by Pate include the right to an adversarial hearing
and an opportunity to gather and present evidence."12
The Court's due process jurisprudence also supports the
incorporation of an adversarial hearing and an opportunity to gather
and present evidence as constitutionally required elements of a
competency determination. The Court has held that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees liberty interests arising from either "the
Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word
'liberty,"' or "from an expectation or interest created by state laws or
policies."" 3 Because state laws regarding competency proceedings
entitle defendants to certain mandated psychiatric evaluations,"14 this
view of procedural due process incorporates the right to
contemporaneous psychiatric examinations into the right to adequate
procedures under Pate. Just as there is a due process right to access
psychiatric experts when a defendant raises an insanity defense,' 15 one
could infer a similar constitutional guarantee to psychiatric expert
assistance when a competency issue arises. 1 16
110. Medina, 505 U.S. at 451 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 450 (citation omitted).
112. The right to an adversarial competency hearing has been explicitly upheld
by lower federal courts as a necessary procedural requirement of fair competency
determinations. See Lewis v. Zon, 573 F. Supp. 2d 804, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(holding that refusal to allow defendant's response to prosecution's evidence on the
issue of competency deprived defendant of an adequate procedure).
113. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).
114. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1369(a) (West 2010); cf 18 U.S.C. §
424 1(b) (2010) (providing federal judges discretion to order a psychiatric evaluation
prior to a hearing).
115. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
116. One can also analogize to Supreme Court precedent regarding adequate
procedures in capital cases, where the Court announced that "any procedure that
precludes the prisoner or his counsel from presenting material relevant to his sanity
or bars consideration of that material by the factfinder is necessarily inadequate."
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 414 (1986). Thus, insofar as a court's failure to
order a competency hearing and an opportunity to administer contemporaneous
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Although the test established by Medina (requiring states to
provide criminal defendants with only those procedures necessary to
avoid offending traditional and fundamental principles of justice) is
narrow, Medina's concurring and dissenting opinions provide further
support for incorporating the right to an adversarial hearing and an
opportunity to gather and present evidence as adequate procedures
under Pate.117
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor disagrees with the
majority regarding the selection of a restrictive, historic, right-based
test for determining whether criminal procedures comport with
procedural due process."' Instead, O'Connor applies the standard
balancing test established in Matthews v. Eldridge,"9 noting that the
same balancing test has been applied in previous criminal procedure
settings.120 In her analysis-which determines that the equities do not
support the procedural right of freeing the defendant from bearing the
burden of proving incompetency 2 '-O'Connor focuses on what
competency procedures will lead to accurate and reliable
determinations.122 In comparing the procedure of placing the burden
of proof on the State with "the requirement of a hearing or a
psychiatric examination," she notes that requiring hearings or
psychiatric examinations would "necessarily increase the reliability of
proceedings." 23 In fact, she reasons that the State's lack of a
"responsibility to gather evidence" supports holding that the State
should not bear the burden of proof at contemporaneous hearings; thus
implying the burden rests with the defendant because the defendant
psychiatric examinations deprives defendant of an opportunity to gather the most
material evidence regarding competency, retrospective competency determinations
under such circumstances should be disfavored.
117. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453-56 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); id. at 456-68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 453 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
119. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
120. Medina, 505 U.S. at 453 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (applying the Matthews balancing test in the context
of criminal procedure and holding that criminal defendants have a due process right
to access a competent psychiatrist when raising an insanity defense)).
121. Id. at 455 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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bears the responsibility of gathering evidence before a court-ordered
competency hearing.124 Based on this analysis, it is likely that a
Matthews balancing analysis would find an adversarial hearing and
required psychiatric examinations constitutionally protected as
adequate procedures mandated by Pate.
Justice Blackmun's dissent begins by reasserting the fundamental
necessity of the right not to be tried while incompetent in a fair system
of criminal justice.125 It then reiterates that Pate guarantees adequate
procedures for determining competency.1 26 According to Blackmun,
due process "demands adequate anticipatory,protectiveprocedures to
minimize the risk that an incompetent person will be convicted." 27
Thus, the only analysis required to determine what procedures
comport with due process involves whether the procedure "is
necessary to protect adequately the underlying due process right"-the
right not to be tried while incompetent.128
Blackmun's view of procedural due process centers on the notion
that the "primary right (the right not to be tried while incompetent)"
cannot be examined separately from the "subsidiary [procedural]
right" (in Medina, the right of the defendant to be free from the burden
of proof in competency proceedings). 129 Thus, in determining whether
the procedure at issue in Medina (allocating the burden of proof in
contemporaneous competency proceedings to defendant) offended due
process, Blackmun asked whether the alternative was required to
protect the substantive right not to be tried while incompetent. 3 o He
answered this inquiry in the affin-mative.13 1 Blackmun would have held
that due process requires the burden of proof be placed on the State
because of his concern with the defendant's opportunity to gather and
present evidence regarding competency.' 3 2 There are several reasons

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
custody).

See id. at 456.
Id. at 457 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 458.
Id
Id. at 458-59.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 458-59.
Id. at 459.
Id at 465 (noting that the State will have greater access to a defendant in
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for this concern. First, the State generally has better access to the
primary source of evidence: the defendant held in jail.13 3 Second,
Blackmun asserts that expert psychiatric opinion provides the
strongest basis for most competency determinations.' 3 4 Third, defense
attorneys rarely find it appropriate to testify regarding their own
observations of the defendant.135 Thus, Blackmun asserts that the
concern with gathering and presenting evidence renders the procedure
(placing the burden of proof on the State) necessary to adequately
protect the right not to be tried while incompetent.1 36
All three opinions in Medina therefore support the assertion that
the adequate procedures guaranteed by Pate necessarily require a
meaningful opportunity for defendant to gather and present evidence
on the issue of competency.' 37 If Pate indeed requires such procedural
safeguards, the remedies for vindicating a defendant's procedural due
process rights must also include vindication of such safeguards. In
other words, where the State has violated a defendant's constitutional
rights by failing to hold a competency hearing, the remedy cannot be a
competency hearing with less protection than the contemporaneous
hearing guaranteed by Pate.
The three alternative remedies for the violation of a defendant's
Pate rights include (1) holding a retrospective, nunc pro tunc
competency hearing to "cure" the violation, 3 8 (2) allowing the State
to argue the constitutional violation was harmless error by holding a
retrospective competency hearing,139 and (3) requiring the court to
reverse the conviction and remand to the State for re-trial.' 4 0 In order

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 465-66.
136. Id. at 463.
137. Indeed, the Third Circuit takes the position that Pate positively
guarantees the right to present evidence in a competency hearing as a
constitutionally required adequate proceeding. See Hull v. Kyler, 190 F.3d 88, 111
(3d Cir. 1999).
138. See Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The state
court can nonetheless cure its failure to hold a competency hearing at the time of
trial by conducting one retroactively.").
139. See Jamesv. Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562, 1570-71 & n.11 (1lth Cir. 1992).
140. Although all circuit courts provide that retrospective determinations are
permissible under Supreme Court precedent, no Supreme Court decision has found
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for any of these remedies to comport with due process, the remedy
must adequately protect the minimal procedural safeguards guaranteed
by Pate. In particular, the remedy must protect one's right under Pate
to (1) an adversarial hearing, and (2) an opportunity to gather and
present evidence.
B. Nunc Pro Tunc HearingsFail to ProvideAdequate Procedures
The purpose of a nunc pro tunc hearing, as inferred from the Latin
phrase meaning "now for then," is to hold a hearing that takes the
place of a contemporaneous hearing as if it had been held at the earlier
time. 141 In order for the State to preserve the conviction through a
nunc pro tunc cure, the State first must establish that a meaningful
retrospective hearing can occur. 142 If the State prevails at this
threshold hearing, a further retrospective hearing will be provided
where the appellant-petitioner must carry the burden of proof.143
1. The State Bears the InitialBurden ofProving Sufficient Evidence
Exists to Hold a Meaningful Nunc Pro Tunc Hearing
When a petitioner establishes a Pate violation, the State must
prove that enough evidence exists to meaningfully determine ex post
such a determination appropriate. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966)
(holding on the narrow facts of the case that the need for a contemporaneous
competency determination rendered a retrospective hearing inadequate); Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183 (1975) (holding that the inherent difficulties of
determining competency retrospectively rendered a retrospective determination
inadequate).
141. See louri v. Ashcroft, 464 F.3d 172, 181-82 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1100 (8th ed. 2004)).
142. See Zapata v. Estelle, 588 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1979) (placing the
burden on the State to prove that sufficient evidence exists to hold a meaningful
retrospective hearing because the State bore responsibility for the constitutional
error); accord Odle, 238 F.3d at 1089-90 (holding that retrospective competency
hearings are permissible only where sufficient evidence exists to make a reasonable
determination of competency).
143. Compare Lokos v. Capps, 625 F.2d 1258, 1262 (5th Cir. 1980) (placing
the burden of proof on the petitioner), and Moran III, 57 F.3d 690, 697 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that the Constitution does not prohibit placing the burden of proof on
petitioners in retrospective competency hearings), with James, 957 F.2d at 1571
(placing the burden of proof in retrospective competency hearings on the State).
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facto the petitioner's competency in a retrospective hearing.14 4 Courts
have held that the burden shifts to the State to prove the
meaningfulness of a retrospective hearing because the State has
violated the petitioner's rights.145 The requirement protects a
petitioner who raises a Pate claiml 4 6 by reversing the conviction
unless the State carries this burden.147 However, the standard often
utilized allows for retrospective determinations so long as evidence
exists that a determination would be "more than mere
speculation" 148 -such a low threshold that one must question the
reliability of such retrospective competency determinations.
The State discharges its obligation of proving a meaningful and
adequate retrospective hearing by establishing that sufficient evidence
exists of the petitioner's mental state at the time of the alleged due
process violation.149 Typically, the State meets its burden upon
compiling evidence that includes declarations prepared by "[e]xpert
witnesses who testified at trial, . . . experts who have since examined
[the petitioner],

. .

. [and] defense counsel" as well as "medical

144. See McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 962 (10th Cir. 2001); James, 957
F.2d at 1570-71. It has also been argued that unless the State raises the "disfavored
remedy" of a retrospective competency hearing, a reviewing court has no sua sponte
duty to order one, resulting in the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See United
States v. Bergman, 599 F.3d 1142, 1160-61 (10th Cir. 2010) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
145. See Zapata, 588 F.2d at 1020.
146. This requirement is absent when a petitioner raises a substantive claim of
incompetency because the State has not committed any error. The petitioner who
raises a substantive claim of incompetency must proceed and attempt to prove his
prior incompetency based on whatever evidence happens to exist.
147. See Martin v. Estelle, 583 F.2d 1373, 1377 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he
question which the court must ask itself, and must answer [is] 'Do there appear to be
presently available to the court tools of principled decision that will produce a
retrospective determination of trial competency sufficiently accurate to be judicially
available?').
148. Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1057 (5th Cir. 1976); accord Wheat v.
Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621, 630 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Thompson v. Commonwealth,
56 S.W.3d 406, 409 (Ky. 2001) (adopting the "more than mere speculation"
standard).
149. See Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001)
("[R]etrospective competency hearings may be held when the record contains
sufficient information upon which to base a reasonable psychiatric judgment.").
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records, psychiatric reports and jail records."' The Tenth Circuit has
established a four-factor test enumerating the type of evidence to be
considered:
(1) the passage of time, (2) the availability of contemporaneous
medical evidence, including medical records and prior competency
determinations, (3) any statements by the defendant in the trial
record, and (4) the availability of individuals and trial witnesses,
both experts and non-experts, who were in a position to interact
with defendant before and during trial, including the trial judge,
counsel for both the government and defendant, and jail officials. 51
If the State proves enough evidence exists to hold a meaningful
retrospective hearing, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine the petitioner's competency at the time of trial.' 52 While the
practice in some jurisdictions allows the reviewing court to determine
whether a retrospective competency hearing is possible, other
jurisdictions favor remand, so that the trial court (where such a
hearing would take place) can make the threshold determination
itself.153
2. Venue for Nunc Pro Tunc Hearings

Venue for a retrospective competency hearing depends on both
the jurisdiction and the court where the matter lies. When an appellant
raises a Pate violation in an appeal or post-conviction proceeding
within the state court system, common practice requires remand to the
150. Id. at 1090.
151. Clayton v. Gibson, 199 F.3d 1162, 1169 (10th Cir. 1999). Some states
have also adopted the four factor Clayton test for use in state appellate court
procedures regarding Pate violations. E.g., People v. Robinson, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d
102, 109-10 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Sanders, 549 S.E.2d 40, 54 (W. Va. 2001).
152. Lokos v. Capps, 625 F.2d 1258, 1262 (5th Cir. 1980).
153. Compare United States v. Renfroe, 825 F.2d 763, 767 (3d Cir. 1987)
("The district court is in the best 'position to determine whether it can make a
retrospective determination of Renfroe's competency during his trial and
sentencing."), and State v. Snyder, 750 So. 2d 832, 855 (La. 1999), with McGregor
v. Gibson 248 F.3d 946, 963 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that insufficient evidence
exists to hold a retrospective competency hearing and not remanding for the district
court to make that determination), and Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 577 (9th Cir.
2010).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2010

27

California Western Law Review, Vol. 47 [2010], No. 2, Art. 8

396

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

State's trial court for a retrospective hearing. 5 4 In federal habeas
corpus proceedings, most circuits require the district court to remand
to the state court for a retrospective competency hearing.' 5 5 In contrast
to this majority practice, some federal circuits have provided habeas
petitioners with retrospective competency hearings in a federal district
court.1 56 In James v. Singletary,15 7 the Eleventh Circuit suggested, in
dicta, that proper procedure requires holding a retrospective
competency hearing in a federal district court because (1) a Pate
violation involves a federal constitutional question, and (2) remand to
state court for a limited evidentiary hearing could create "a virtually
unappealable proceeding caught in the never-never land between
criminal and civil procedure." 58 Furthermore, state trial courts may
favor findings of competency because of a bias toward preserving
convictions and avoiding the burden of retrying the case.' 59
3. Burden ofProofat Nunc Pro Tunc Hearings
Initially, the placement of the burden of proof in a retrospective
competency hearing depends on the placement of the burden of proof
applied at contemporaneous competency hearings in the trial court
where the petitioner was convicted. For instance, in federal
prosecutions, circuit courts interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 4241 as placing
the burden of proof on the government in a contemporaneous hearing
likewise place the burden of proof on the government in retrospective

154. See, e.g., People v. Ary, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 494 (Ct. App. 2004);
Snyder, 750 So.2d at 855.
155. See, e.g., Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001); Zapata
v. Estelle, 585 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1979). In Pate, no retrospective hearing could
be held, but the Court considered remanding to the state court for a retrospective
competency hearing. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966).
156. E.g., Martin v. Estelle, 546 F.2d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 1977).
157. 957 F.2d 1562 (1992).
158. Id. at 1571 n.14.
159. Robert D. Miller & Edward J. Germain, The Retrospective Evaluation of
Competency to Stand Trial, 11 INT'L J.L. & PsYCHIATRY 113, 120 (1988). Some
courts will remand to the specific trial judge before whom the constitutional error
occurred, a practice that leads to an even stronger danger of bias, as few trial judges
readily and happily overturn convictions that they personally oversaw. See id. at
124.
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hearings.1 60 Similarly, if an appellant challenges a conviction within
the State's appellate courts, the State will bear the burden of proof in a
retrospective competency hearing if the State would bear the burden in
a contemporaneous hearing.' 6 1 Generally, appellate and habeas courts
place the burden of proving incompetency on the petitioner when the
petitioner would have bore that burden at a contemporaneous

hearing.162
Circuit courts that have adopted the nunc pro tunc approach to
remedying Pate violations place the burden of proof in the
retrospective competency hearing on the defendant. The Fifth Circuit
was the first to widely approve of the procedure.163 Subsequently,
other circuit courts adopted a similar position. For instance, the Ninth
Circuit, in Moran v. Godinez,' placed the burden on the petitioner,
holding that the petitioner has no right to be free from the burden of
proof in retrospective nunc pro tunc hearings because the petitioner
has no right to be free from the burden of proof in contemporaneous
competency determinations.1 65 A year later, the Eighth Circuit
independently adopted the same holding and the same rationale.' 66

160. See United States v. Hutson, 821 F.2d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 817 F.2d 285, 294 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that Congress
placed the burden of proof in contemporaneous competency hearings on the
government)).
161. Commonwealth v. Simpson, 704 N.E.2d 1131, 1136 (Mass. 1999)
(holding the State has an opportunity to prove defendant was competent at the time
of trial in a retrospective hearing held after the defendant files a motion for new
trial).
162. See Moran III, 57 F.3d 690, 697 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
Constitution does not prohibit placing the burden of proof on petitioners in
retrospective competency hearings); Lokos v. Capps, 625 F.2d 1258, 1261-62 (5th
Cir. 1980) (placing the burden of proof on the petitioner).
163. Id. at 1262.
164. Moran III, 57 F.3d at 690.
165. Id. at 697; see also People v. Ary, 246 P.3d 322, 329 (Cal. 2011)
(adopting Moran's holding that the State may place the burden of proof in a nunc
pro tunc competency hearing on defendant raising a Pate violation).
166. Rhode v..01k-Long, 84 F.3d 284, 288 (8th Cir. 1996).
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4. The FailuresofNunc Pro Tunc Hearings
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Moran reasons that nunc pro tunc
competency hearings appropriately remedy Pate violations because
they cure the violation by holding a substitute proceeding.167 in
Moran, the court considered whether a reviewing court may allocate
the burden of proof in retrospective competency hearings to the
petitioner or appellant.16 8 The court reasoned that what constitutes an
adequate procedure in a contemporaneous hearing also constitutes an
adequate procedure in a retrospective hearing.1 69 Therefore, following
the Supreme Court's holding in Medina, the Ninth Circuit held that a
petitioner may constitutionally bear the burden of proof in
retrospective hearings.' 7 0
The Moran court cannot be criticized for concluding that the
adequate procedures required for a contemporaneous hearing must
also be the adequate procedures required for a retrospective hearing:
the conclusion is inherent in the definition of a nunc pro tunc
proceeding. But, the full application of that conclusion, requiring the
adequate procedures for contemporaneously determining competency
to be equally present in a retrospective hearing, uncovers the
insufficiencies intrinsic to nunc pro tunc determinations of
competency.
Circuit Judge Pregerson's dissent in Moran highlights the
deficiencies of retrospective competency determinations.171 Pregerson
dissented because he believed the burden of proof in nunc pro tunc
hearings should fall on the State to protect the petitioner from those
deficiencies. Pregerson reasoned that the State should bear the burden
because, in most cases, evidence becomes stale or unavailable by the
time a retrospective hearing is held and requiring the petitioner to bear
167. See Moran III, 57 F.3d at 695-96.
168. Id. at 697.
169. Id.
170. Id. Moran actually went further, holding that a Nevada law assigning the
burden of proof to the State in retrospective competency hearings does not create "a
federally protected state liberty interest in such a right." Id. at 697-98. Thus, Richard
Allan Moran's conviction and death sentence were upheld in a Nevada
postconviction court despite the incorrect application of Nevada law; nevertheless,
federal courts offered Moran no relief. Id. at 697-98, 700.
171. See id. at 701 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
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the burden of proving incompetency under such conditions "would
result in affirmance in every case where the record has become
stale."l 72 However, Pregerson's dissent rests on the suggestion that the
Medina standard for allocating the burden of proof in
contemporaneous competency hearings should not equally apply in
retrospective hearings.1 73 This proposition cuts against the notion that
a nunc pro tunc competency hearing, as an equivalent stand-in, cures
the failure to hold a contemporaneous hearing.
Instead of requiring a nunc pro tunc hearing to provide procedural
safeguards equivalent to those found in a contemporaneous hearing
(the adequate procedures guaranteed by Pate), Pregerson would
require the procedures of a nunc pro tunc hearing to independently
satisfy the due process "fundamental fairness" analysis.' 74 For
Pregerson, a nunc pro tunc hearing constitutes a fundamentally fair
proceeding if the State bears the burden of proof, despite the
remainder of the deficiencies he himself noted.17 5
Therefore, it seems that even if the burden of proof were shifted to
the State, nunc pro tunc competency determinations do not adequately
protect the rights guaranteed by Pate. Of the two procedural rights
identified by Pate as essential elements of a fundamentally fair
contemporaneous competency hearing (an adversarial hearing and an
opportunity to gather evidence), nunc pro tunc competency hearings
adequately protect only the right to an adversarial hearing.
The primary failure of nunc pro tunc hearings results from the
utter lack of protection for the right to gather and present evidence. In
fact, Pregerson finds the primary failure of fundamental fairness
occurs when the State benefits from defendant's failure to gather
evidence of his or her relevant mental condition at the time of trial-a
result caused by the State's failure to order a contemporaneous
hearing.' 76 In other words, a nunc pro tunc competency hearing fails
the fundamental fairness test announced in Medina because it is unfair
to determine competency to stand trial when the defendant had no
opportunity to gather evidence of his incompetency.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 703.
See id. at 702-03.
See id. at 703.
See id. at 702.
See id. at 703.
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Based on existing evidence in the record, a nunc pro tunc
competency hearing could lead to a finding of competency when
ample evidence of incompetency could have been gathered by
contemporaneous psychiatric evaluations. When the court fails to
order a hearing, the defendant has no notice of an adversarial
proceeding and no purpose for gathering such evidence.
Because nunc pro tunc competency hearings fail to protect the
rights guaranteed by Pate, the remedy generally afforded by reviewing
courts faced with a successful Pate claim should be held
unconstitutional. It offends fundamental fairness to determine
competency with procedures inadequate to protect the right to a
contemporaneous and adversarial proceeding, regardless whether the
determination is made at the time of trial or on appeal. Whenever the
determination is made, the procedures used to make the competency
determination must protect those rights.
C. Harmless ErrorRetrospectiveHearingsFailto
Provide Adequate Procedures
Generally, a trial court's failure to order a competency hearing
when reasonable doubt exists constitutes a per se prejudicial
constitutional error and "is not subject to harmless error review." 7 7
Nevertheless, the general practice allows courts to cure the violation
with a nunc pro tunc hearing. In contrast to the general practice, the
Eleventh Circuit, in James v. Singletary,"8 described the practice of
retrospectively determining competency as "harmless error analysis in
disguise."' 7 9 Analysis of the Eleventh Circuit's reinterpretation of
retrospective competency hearings' purpose requires an understanding
of the purpose and function of harmless error analysis. Thus, a short
synopsis of Supreme Court harmless error analysis follows below.
Then, the Eleventh Circuit's use of harmless error retrospective
hearings is criticized for failing to meet the requirements of due
process.

177. See People v. Ary, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 492 (Ct. App. 2004).
178. 957 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1992).
179. Id. at 1571 n.14.
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1. Supreme Court Jurisprudenceon Harmless ErrorAnalysis
In general, appellate courts reviewing a state conviction on direct
appeal apply the standard established in Chapman v. California8 0 : to
preserve the conviction the State must prove the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.'8 1 When a state court conviction is
challenged in a federal habeas corpus review, courts generally apply
the standard established in Brecht v. Abrahamsonl82 : the conviction
must be reversed if "the error 'had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict."" 83 Under both standards,
the burden of proof lies with the State and the error is presumed to be
prejudicial, thus favoring reversal.184
While reviewing courts may inquire whether most constitutional
errors constitute harmless violations, the Court has consistently held
that some errors require automatic reversal. 8 5 The Court requires
automatic reversal when an error is structural-that is, when "the
error 'necessarily render[s] a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an
unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence."' 1 86 Contrast
structural errors with trial errors: a structural error "affect[s] the
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error
in the trial process itself."1 87 In between errors amenable to harmless
error analysis and structural errors requiring automatic reversal, one
finds errors that require a showing of prejudice in order to
demonstrate a constitutional violation.' 8 8 In such cases, a sufficient
180. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
181. Id. at 24.
182. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
183. Id. at 623 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
184. See 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 83, at 1514-15; O'Neal v.
McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1995).
185. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (holding that conviction
before a partial judge is not made harmless by the fact that the defendant was
guilty); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (recognizing the Court's longstanding rule requiring automatic reversal where an error's inherent harmfulness
precludes harmless error analysis).
186. Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218-19 (2006) (quoting Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999)).
187. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (holding that
suppression of evidence favorable to the defense by the prosecution constitutes
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showing of prejudice by the appellant defeats a harmless error
argument by the State.1 89
1armless error analysis may apply when a criminal defendant
raises and proves a Pate violation in two different contexts: (1) when
the Pate violation consists of a court's failure to sua sponte order a
competency hearing despite evidence of incompetency, or (2) when
the violation consists of some ancillary violation within a
contemporaneous competency hearing rendering the proceedings
procedurally inadequate.
2. James and Retrospective Competency Determinationsas Harmless
ErrorAnalysis
In James v. Singletary,'9 0 the Eleventh Circuit broke from
precedent established in the Fifth Circuitl 91 by holding that the State
should bear the burden of proof in retrospective competency
hearings.' 92 James's reasoning radically reinterprets the meaning of
retrospective hearings-retrospective hearings no longer "cure" and
"stand in for" the missing contemporaneous hearing.193 Instead, under
James, a retrospective competency hearing establishes the Pate
violation was harmless error because the defendant was nevertheless
competent.194 Although some courts consider this "holding" to
constitute dicta, James has been followed by the Eleventh Circuit and

constitutional error only if a reasonable probability of prejudice exists).
189. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995) (holding that harmless
error analysis should not be used where an appellant has made a successful Bagley
claim, because the claim itself requires a showing of a reasonable probability of
prejudice). Used in this sense, a Bagley claim is synonymous with a Brady claim,
which targets violations of the right to have the prosecution turn over favorable
evidence to the defendant. See id. at 432-47.
190. 957 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1992).
191. The Eleventh Circuit was created on October 1, 1981 by dividing the
Fifth Circuit. In its first published opinion, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
decisions made by the Fifth Circuit before the close of September 30, 1982
constituted binding precedent on the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Pritchard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981).
192. James, 957 F.2d at 1571.
193. Seeid. at1570-72&n.11.
194. See id.
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many states regarding its reallocation of the burden of proof in
competency hearings.' 95
James concluded that a retrospective competency hearing
following a Pate violation constitutes harmless error analysis due to
its interpretation of Pate.'96 Because the Supreme Court in Pate (and
in Dusky and Drope) reversed convictions and remanded for new trials
where the State could not establish sufficient evidence existed to make
a meaningful competency determination, the James court inferred a
petitioner's showing of a Pate violation produced a rebuttable
presumption of incompetency. 197 If the Court had presumed Robinson
to be competent and thus placed the burden of proof in a retrospective
hearing on petitioner Robinson, the correct remedy when a hearing
could not be held would be affirmance of the conviction.1 98 Therefore,
195. See Moore v. Campbell, 344 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing
James for proposition that a Pate violation consisting of failure to hold a
competency hearing at trial constitutes harmless error if the defendant was
competent at that time). The Eleventh Circuit has not treated the allocation of the
burden of proof in retrospective hearings to the State or the treatment of such
hearings as harmless error analysis as dicta. A later Eleventh Circuit decision
describes retrospective competency hearings as "nunc pro tunc" proceedings, but
nevertheless retains the shifted burden of proof established in James. See Watts v.
Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 1287 n.6 (11th Cir. 1996). The most recent federal district
court treatment of Pate claims in the circuit follows James in holding that a Pate
violation "establishes a rebuttable presumption of incompetency." See, e.g., White v.
Crosby, No. 8:04-cv-2651-T-30TGW, 2008 WL 540771, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 25,
2008).
Many state high courts have approved of the reasoning in James, adopting
the burden shifting practice established by the Eleventh Circuit. See Nelson v. State,
43 So. 3d 20, 33 (Fla. 2010) (citing James, 957 F.2d at 1570) (holding that
defendant is presumed incompetent after successfully raising Pate claim); State v.
Snyder, 750 So. 2d 832, 855 n.16 (La. 1999) (quoting James, 957 F.2d at 1570,
1571 n.14) (adopting Eleventh Circuit's reasoning that retrospective competency
determination constitutes harmless error analysis); State v. Sanders, 549 S.E.2d 40,
54 n.10 (W.Va. 2001) (quoting James, 957 F.2d at 1570, 1571 n.14) (adopting
James' conclusion that retrospective competency hearings constitute harmless error
analysis and that Pate creates a presumption of incompetency). Before James, the
Nevada Supreme Court independently shifted the burden of proof in retrospective
competency hearings to the State. See Doggett v. Warden, Nev. State Prison, 572
P.2d 207, 210 (Nev. 1977).
196. SeeJames,957F.2dat1570-71 &n.11.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1570n.11.
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the James court concluded that providing the State with an
opportunity to "rectify the trial court's error by means of a nunc pro
tunc competency hearing can only be interpreted as a harmless error

analysis."'

99

The shift in the burden of proof in retrospective competency
hearings constitutes the one reason to applaud the Eleventh Circuit's
practice, because of the following: First, the Pate violation occurred
because of the State's failure to hold a competency hearing. The State
benefited from this error, thus, it should bear the burden of proof.200
Second, the error occurred because the evidence regarding
competency was, at best, deadlocked; thus, forcing petitioner to prove
incompetency, even by a preponderance of the evidence, would result
in the resolution of close cases in favor of the State-the party who
committed the original constitutional violation. 20 1 Third, the State's
failure to order a contemporaneous hearing led to defendant's failure
to gather evidence regarding his mental state at the time of trial; the
State's error led to an evidentiary gap. Consequently, James partially
affords defendants justice by appropriately shifting the burden of
proof onto the State and favoring the petitioner or appellant by
presuming incompetency.
However, treating a retrospective competency hearing as a
harmless error analysis instead of a nunc pro tunc substitute for a
contemporaneous hearing does not eliminate the inherent unreliability
and inadequacy of all retrospective hearings. Therefore, James and its
progeny also fail to protect the rights of criminal defendants. The
remedy afforded by reviewing courts must provide at least the same
adequacy as a contemporaneous hearing to satisfy the rights
guaranteed by Pate. In this regard, a Pate violation would only be
harmless if the State could prove that a retrospective competency
determination could be held with equivalent indicia of reliability and
procedural adequacy-an impossible burden to bear because of the
inherent loss of reliability in any ex post determination of
competency.
Under Supreme Court precedent, a Pate violation should be
considered a structural, per se error because the failure to hold a
199. Id.
200. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
201. See Moran III, 57 F.3d 690, 703 (9th Cir. 1995).
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contemporaneous competency hearing deprives defendant of the
notice required to gather evidence regarding his competency.2 02 A
Pate violation constitutes a structural error in the procedure of
gathering and presenting evidence that permeates any subsequent
attempts to retrospectively determine competency. Such an error is not
amenable to the harmless error analysis established in Brecht: it is
nonsensical to ask whether "the error 'had substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict"' when no
proceeding was held in which a jury was asked to determine
competency. 203
The Eleventh Circuit's attempt to utilize retrospective competency
hearings as harmless error analyses fails to comply with the due
process guarantee of adequate procedures under Pate. The approach
contains the same structural deficiencies as nunc pro tunc competency
hearings: they proceed on limited evidence making them inherently
less reliable than the contemporaneous hearings guaranteed by Pate.
As neither form of retrospective competency hearings currently in
practice complies with Pate's own due process guarantee of adequate
202. Although the prototypical Pate violation involves a complete failure to
hold a competency hearing despite bona fide or reasonable doubt of defendant's
competency, a Pate violation also may involve a procedural error occurring during a
contemporaneous competency hearing. See, e.g., Lewis v. Zon, 573 F. Supp. 2d 804,
821 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); State v. Boorigie, 41 P.3d 764, 771-72 (Kan. 2002). Because
such an ancillary constitutional error (such as the right to confront witnesses) could
render a contemporaneous hearing an inadequate procedure, these errors give rise to
Pate claims. However, unlike Pate claims consisting of a failure to hold a
contemporaneous hearing, this subset of Pate claims can be subject to harmless
error analysis. See State v. Davis, 130 P.3d 69, 77 (Kan. 2006) (holding that a Pate
violation cannot be subject to harmless error analysis when the error consists of the
failure to hold a competency hearing, although errors within a competency hearing
may be subject to harmless error analysis). If the ancillary constitutional error did
not have an effect on the court or jury's ultimate determination of whether defendant
was competent, then the constitutional error is deemed harmless. See, e.g., Lewis,
573 F. Supp. 2d at 821 (holding Pate violation was not harmless where depriving
defendant of the opportunity to cross examine evidence in a contemporaneous
competency determination substantially altered the competency hearing); Boorigie,
41 P.3d at 771-72 (utilizing harmless error analysis to determine that failure to
suspend all proceedings after a competency hearing was ordered constituted
harmless error because no trial court made prejudicial decisions during the relevant
proceedings).
203. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (citing Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
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procedures to determine competency, courts should look to another
remedy.
D. The AppropriateRemedy: Reversal of the Conviction and
Remand for New Trial
The only appropriate remedy for a Pate violation, not including
Pate violations consisting of harmless, ancillary constitutional
violations, is the only remedy that the Supreme Court has ever
granted: reversal of the conviction and remand for new trial.2 04
Because Pate guarantees adequate procedures, including the right to
present evidence, the right to cross-examine, and the right to an
adversarial hearing, 205 retrospective competency hearings of any kind
fail to vindicate a defendant's Pate rights.2 06 Remedying a Pate
violation with a procedurally inadequate competency determination
completely vitiates the rights guaranteed by Pate because such a
remedy affirms the conviction without ever holding a procedurally
adequate competency hearing. The conviction should be reversed.
Only then may the State hold a new competency hearing to determine
if defendant is competent to stand trial at the new proceedings. Any
204. The United States Supreme Court has never allowed a Pate violation to
be cured by a retrospective determination, either as a nunc pro tunc proceeding or as
harmless error analysis. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1966); Drope
v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). Immediately subsequent to the Patedecision,
some state high courts interpreted Supreme Court precedent as implying that Pate
violations could not be cured by any further proceeding, but rather required reversal.
See Hayden v. Commonwealth, 563 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Ky. 1978), overruled by
Thompson v. Commonwealth, 56 S.W.3d 406, 409-10 (Ky. 2001). Only after the
circuit courts established procedures for holding retrospective competency hearings
did those state high courts reverse course. See Thompson, 56 S.W.3d at 409-10.
Most recently, a California Supreme Court Justice wrote, in a concurring opinion,
that "[r]eason exists to believe that the United States Supreme Court would not
approve the procedure" of retrospectively determining competency following a Pate
violation. People v. Ary, 246 P.3d 322, 330 (Cal. 2011) (Werdegar, J., concurring).
The concurring opinion supported the assertion on the same grounds given here: the
Supreme Court has consistently denied the adequacy of the procedure because of its
"inherent difficulties." Id.
205. See supra Part III.A.
206. See Evans v. Raines, 800 F.2d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1986) (When the state
court fails [to sua sponte order a competency hearing under Pate], it often may be
impossible to repair the damage retrospectively.").
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other remedy is inadequate to protect the right not to stand trial while
incompetent.
Although treating Pate violations as un-curable, per se prejudicial
constitutional errors appears to be a harsh rule,2 07 such a treatment
would change only a small fraction of the cases where a Pate claim is
raised.2 0 8 Furthermore, the Dusky standard of incompetency poses a
very high threshold because the defendant must lack a factual and
rational understanding of the proceedings and the ability to
communicate with counsel. 209 A criminal defendant must therefore
display symptoms of a severe mental disorder to create reasonable
doubt that his or her incompetence comes within that standard. 210 The
cost of retrying this small number of cases should be borne by the
State because the judge, as a state actor, failed to provide the
defendant with due process.2 1 1
CONCLUSION

In his dissenting opinion in Medina, Justice Blackmun wrote,
"Because the Due Process Clause is not the Some Process Clause, I
remain convinced that it requires careful balancing of the individual
and governmental interests at stake to determine what process is
due."2 12 The Supreme Court has considered and decided the issue of
207. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181-82 (1975) (noting that forcing
the State to retry a defendant constitutes a "hard reality").
208. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 183 ("Given the inherent difficulties of such a
nunc pro tunc determination under the most favorable of circumstances .

.

. we

cannot conclude that such a procedure would be adequate here."); People v. Ary, 13
Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 493 (Ct. App. 2004) ("We emphasize, however, that it is the rare
case in which a meaningful retrospective competency determination will be
possible."). Thus, it appears rare that sufficient evidence will exist with which to
hold a retrospective hearing, and the majority of Pate violations result in reversal
and remand under present law.
209. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
210. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the evidence before the trial judge in Pate did not create
doubt of an impairment sufficient to satisfy the Dusky standard).
211. See, e.g., Drope, 420 U.S. at 181-82 ("That this might have aborted the
trial is a hard reality, but we cannot fail to note that such a result might have been
avoided by prompt psychiatric examination before trial, when it was sought by
petitioner.").
212. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 463 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
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whether criminal defendants have a due process right to adequate
procedures for determining competency: Pate guarantees this right.2 13
The remedy for a Pate violation cannot affirm the conviction without
providing the adequate procedures guaranteed by Pate; otherwise, the
Pate rights are completely vitiated. Thus, when considering what
procedures appropriately remedy a Pate violation, utmost concern
must first be given to protecting the individual's interest in the due
process rights guaranteed by Pate and the Due Process Clause.
Any attempt to retrospectively determine the competency of a
criminal defendant is inherently less reliable than a contemporaneous
hearing. Retrospective hearings also lack the procedural safeguards
provided by a contemporaneous hearing-most importantly, the right
and ability to gather and present evidence. All such remedies must be
avoided.
In order to best protect the substantive right not to be tried while
incompetent, the due process requirements of Pate demand the State
bear the burden of retrying defendants who have been convicted
without an adequate hearing. 2 14 Pate guarantees adequate procedures
to determine competency to protect incompetent defendants from
dissenting).
213. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 385-86; Drope, 420 U.S. at 172.
214. The additional administrative burden of retrying all cases involving a
Pate violation would likely not be excessive because the majority of Pate violations
result in remand anyway. See People v. Ary, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 493 (Ct. App.
2004) ("We emphasize, however, that it is the rare case in which a meaningful
retrospective competency determination will be possible.") The burden of retrying
all cases involving a Pate violation, at least those cases where defendant received no
contemporaneous hearing, would likely not be excessive. Recognizing the challenge
Pate poses to federal magistrates and district judges (requiring a sua sponte
assessment of defendants' mental capacity in every appearance before the court),
several scholars and practitioners have called for better mental health education for
legal professionals. See Jeffrey Manske & Mark Osler, Crazy Eyes: The
Discernment of Competency by a FederalMagistrate Judge, 67 LA. L. REV. 751,
782-83 (2007) (arguing, from the standpoint of a practicing federal magistrate judge,
for the necessity of training judges as well as attorneys to "identify[] competency
issues" in order to reduce erroneous competency determinations); Richard E.
Redding, Why it is Essential to Teach About Mental Health Issues in Criminal Law
(And a Primer on How to Do it), 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 407, 416-17 (2004)
(arguing that first year legal education curriculums should teach the identification of
competency issues). Hopefully, by improving knowledge of mental health issues,
judges may increase the accuracy of their competency assessments and decrease the
number of Pateviolations.
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being tried without the required mental capacity. When Pate is
violated, potentially incompetent defendants are tried and convicted.
Indeed, some of these potentially incompetent defendants are
incompetent. When retrospective hearings unfairly uphold those
convictions, the bedrock principle prohibiting the trial and conviction
of incompetent defendants is demolished. Because retrospective
hearings deny criminal defendants their last opportunity for due
process, American courts continue to try and convict potentially
incompetent defendants without appellate relief. Reversing and
remanding these cases presents the only opportunity to ensure that
only defendants who are competent, and guilty, are convicted.
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